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Foreign direct investment 
in times of crisis
Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen and Gary Clyde Hufbauer*
The paper compares the current FDI recession with FDI responses to 
past economic crises. While the decline in outflows from developed 
countries has been similar in magnitude to that in previous recessions, 
the recovery in FDI has been much slower than in the past. Inflows to 
emerging markets, which remained stable during previous economic 
crises, have experienced an overall decline. Both patterns indicate 
that the global scale of the current crisis has had a different and more 
marked FDI response than after earlier individual country crises. 
Compared with other global economic downturns since the 1970s, 
the current FDI recession has also been greater in magnitude. (The 
exception to this was the large FDI plunge in the early 2000s, despite 
the much smaller economic crisis at the time.) To the extent past FDI 
patterns can provide relevant insights to the current FDI slump, this 
could indicate that global FDI flows may remain below 2007 levels until 
at least 2014. The paper concludes by recommending policymakers to 
not just further liberalize FDI regimes – the typical response to earlier 
crises – but rather to use the downturn to completely rethink their FDI 
policies, with an enhanced focus on promotion of “sustainable FDI”. 
1. Introduction
In 2007, global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows amounted to a 
historical high of around $2 trillion – a sum equivalent to more than 16 per cent 
of the world’s gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) at the time.1 This marked 
the peak of a four-year upward trend in FDI flows. Along with the subsequent 
worldwide collapse in real estate values, stock markets, consumer confidence, 
production, access to credit, and world trade, global FDI flows also began to 
fall – by 16 per cent in 2008, and when worldwide output contracted in 2009 
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for the first time in sixty years, FDI declined a further 40 per cent. In 
2010 FDI stagnated at just above US$1 trillion.  
Figure 1. The FDI recession
 
The decline in FDI flows can be attributed to three main 
factors (UNCTAD, 2009a). Firstly, the global financial crisis has led to 
liquidity constraints for transnational corporations (TNCs) worldwide, 
as access to credit has tightened and corporate balance sheets have 
deteriorated. Even if they wanted to, the capacity of firms to invest 
has thereby weakened considerably. Secondly, the traditionally strong 
link between economic growth and FDI flows means that the world 
slowdown – particularly in the developed world – has further decreased 
the appetite of TNCs for new investment abroad. Finally, the crisis has 
probably fostered a more cautious attitude among managers, resulting 
in a move away from high-risk projects (such as major infrastructure) to 
safer assets (in the extreme, government bonds).
Disentangling more detailed implications of the crisis for TNCs 
is difficult, depending, inter alia, on the type and extent of production 
and financial linkages between parent firms and foreign affiliates, 
sector and industry characteristics, host and home state economic 
performance, modes of entry (see e.g. Alfaro and Chen, 2010). Rather 
than analysing in detail the many complex, and at times endogenous, 
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channels through which the crisis has impacted FDI patterns, the aim of 
this paper is simpler. Taking a bird’s-eye view, we ask just how bad the 
“FDI recession” has been in the wake of the crisis compared to previous 
such episodes? Has it been unique in terms of either its severity or 
the political response? Comparing the current FDI recession with FDI 
patterns during and after past crises may in turn provide insights to 
how long the FDI slump can be expected to last. 
2. The FDI recession in brief
All main FDI components have been negatively affected since 
2007 (figure 2). Even after sales and profits of foreign affiliates began to 
improve in late 2009, parent companies continued to repatriate large 
shares of their profits, rather than invest in host states (UNCTAD, 2011). 
Intra-company loans have dwindled also, as TNCs have restructured 
their operations – for instance, by relocating activities to countries 
which have weathered the crisis – and compelled their foreign affiliates 
to help strengthen parental balance sheets at home (UNCTAD, 2009b). 
As a result, not only have host countries struggled to attract new FDI 
during the crisis, they have struggled to retain what they already had. 
As we shall see later, this pattern is reminiscent of past crises, where the 
fall in more liquid FDI components was the main driver of declines in
Figure 2. Quarterly FDI components for 36 selected countries, 
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FDI. What is perhaps more worrying, therefore, is the disproportionate 
fall in equity investment since the beginning of 2009. This is notable, 
as equity investments reflect the long-term strategic commitment by 
TNCs to their host countries, and typically are not determined by short-
term factors such as liquidity demands or tax-considerations, unlike 
reinvested earnings and intra-company loans (Desai et al., 2003; Ramb 
and Weichenreider, 2005). The stagnant level of equity investments 
may therefore signal that a recovery of FDI flows could take longer after 
this crisis, a possibility we will return to later. 
Given that the crisis started in Western countries, and economic 
growth is by far the most important determinant of FDI, it should 
come as no surprise that FDI flows to and from developed countries 
declined more sharply than the corresponding flows to and from 
emerging economies (figure 3). The downturn has had a particularly 
strong impact on Western banks and financial institutions, which as a 
result had to cancel, postpone, or downscale cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) – the most important mode for FDI. 
The global drop in FDI has therefore primarily been due to 
the steep decline in cross-border M&A deals of developed-country 
companies since 2007. Despite a slight rebound in cross-border M&As 
worldwide in 2010, overall these were nevertheless 67 per cent below 
their level three years earlier. 
Figure 3. FDI flows, 2006-2010
(In billions of dollars) 
0
500
1 000
1 500
2 000
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Outflows
Developed economies
0
200
400
600
800
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Inflows
Emerging economies
22          Transnational Corporations, Vol. 20, No. 1 (April  2011)
For emerging economies, FDI remained an important stabilizer 
in the early stages of the crisis. While their net inflows of portfolio 
investments and bank lending were negative in 2008 (IMF, 2009), their 
FDI inflows actually increased, albeit at a slower pace than previous 
years, and outflows grew as well. But as the credit crunch and recession 
spread to emerging markets in the second half of 2008, both their 
outflows and inflows of FDI started to decline, and 2009 was therefore 
the year when the FDI recession became truly global in character. 
Apart from the drop in M&As, there was a reduction in greenfield 
investments – a class of FDI that is more important in emerging markets 
than developed economies – which dropped 15 per cent in emerging 
economies from 2008 to 2009. In 2010, however, FDI inflows began to 
rise again, driven by strong performance in much of Latin America and 
Asia. 
Uncertain FDI outlook for the coming years
So what does the future hold? On the one hand, undoubtedly 
there are economic and political factors at work which will counteract 
the current slump in global FDI. 
Firstly, a number of major emerging economies have weathered 
the crisis better than developed countries, and developing and transition 
economies now account for more than half of global FDI inflows – the 
highest share ever recorded. With respect to outflows, developing and 
transition economies accounted for more than 25 per cent of global 
outflows in 2009 – also the highest share on record – compared to 
less than 10 per cent just ten years earlier. Many “Southern” TNCs are 
increasingly investing abroad, and particularly so in other emerging 
markets (Sauvant et al., 2010).
This geographic shift in the distribution of global FDI flows seems 
likely to continue, as the positive growth prospects in countries like India 
and China are a strong incentive for TNCs with the necessary funds to 
invest, particularly through market-seeking and efficiency-seeking FDI. 
Secondly, the policy response to the crisis has been rather 
favourable to TNCs overall. With respect to the international investment 
regime, some countries are slowly moving towards a re-balancing of 
the rights and obligations between investors and their host countries 
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(Waibel et al., 2010). This shift in favour of host countries is not directly 
related to the crisis, but rather a response to the rising number and 
impact of investor-state arbitrations over the last decade. Also, it should 
not be taken as an indication that the international investment regime 
is unravelling, as investment promotion and protection treaties are still 
being signed in large numbers, either as stand-alone agreements or 
as parts of preferential trade agreements. Although the rush to sign 
investment treaties has slowed compared to a decade ago – and a few 
countries have even begun cancelling theirs – this is unlikely to have a 
significant impact on global investment flows (see e.g. Yackee, 2010; 
Poulsen, 2010). 
National FDI regimes, rather than investment rules on the 
international level, are now the main policy drivers of FDI flows. 
Where data are available, there are no signs that the crisis has led to 
a protectionist backlash − while expropriation of foreign assets in the 
natural resources sector was beginning to become fashionable before the 
crisis in parts of Latin America, for instance, falling commodity prices in 
the initial stages of the crisis made expropriation less attractive (Lloyd’s, 
2009). With respect to less extreme forms of FDI restriction, however, 
recent years have seen an increase in limitations on cross-border M&A 
activity, particularly when target firms have been considered strategic 
industries, or when investment has been facilitated through sovereign 
or quasi-sovereign entities (Sauvant, 2009). These trends began before 
the onset of the crisis  (OECD and UNCTAD, 2010), and although some 
national bailout packages are likely to have particularly adverse effects 
on FDI – either directly (by being closed to participation by foreign-
owned firms), or indirectly (by allowing government officials greater 
discretion to favour national firms) – most investment initiatives taken 
during the crisis have been aimed at facilitating, rather than restricting, 
FDI (UNCTAD, 2009a). The issue of whether beggar-thy-neighbour 
policies are on the rise in the trade regime is as yet unresolved,2 but 
the general trend is clearly towards greater openness for TNCs in most 
countries. 
Yet, there are also reasons to be pessimistic about the prospects 
for FDI over the coming years. While the world economy has begun to 
expand once again, growth remains sluggish in many regions, considering 
2  Compare, e.g. Global Trade Alert (2009) with Rodrik (2009). Also see  Hufbauer 
et al. (2010).  
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the magnitude of (potential) output lost in recent years (figure 4). And, 
while China is moving towards private-sector-led growth once again, 
austerity reforms are likely to slow the recovery in key Western markets. 
Also, credit is still tight despite low interest rates, which dampens the 
ability of firms to expand their activities at home and abroad. Finally, 
the risk of currency wars looms large, as global imbalances persist, 
and remaining sovereign and bank vulnerabilities heighten concerns 
about the stability of the global financial system. The crisis itself was a 
humbling experience for the economics profession, which largely failed 
to predict its timing and magnitude, and those organizations (including 
UNCTAD, 2010b) which expect FDI to return to 2008 levels as early as 
next year, may prove to have been unduly optimistic. 
Figure 4. Real GDP growth, selected countries, 2007-2012
Given these uncertainties, it may be informative to look at FDI 
patterns during past crises for hints about the prospects for recovery 
in TNCs’ investment activity. Not because past events are necessarily a 
good indicator for present conditions, but rather to see if the current 
FDI recession is unique in terms of its scale or policy reactions. 
3. FDI during past crises 
Individual country crises
 We begin by looking at FDI patterns during individual country 
crises. As a benchmark for the 2007 subprime crisis in the United 
States, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) assembled historical data on 
18 bank-centred financial crises in developed countries. Unlike the 
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current downturn, several of these were relatively minor affairs, and 
we therefore focus on the so-called “Big Five” systemic financial crises, 
which all led to major falls in economic performance for several years: 
Finland (1991), Japan (1992), Norway (1987), Spain (1977) and Sweden 
(1991) . 
Figure 5. Median GDP growth and FDI trajectories 
after the “Big Five”
figure 5 plots the median country real GDP growth and FDI trajectories 
from one year before the crises to three years after. Median rather than 
mean values are used so that results are not driven by outliers. As the 
crises were in developed countries, the impact on outflows may be 
particularly illuminating for the current FDI downturn: when median 
real GDP growth turned negative, one year into the crises – as global 
GDP did in 2009 – outflows had fallen as much as developed country 
outflows fell during the current downturn, by almost 60 per cent. But 
while that marked the end of the downward trend in outflows after the 
individual country crises, 2010 figures available at the time of writing 
indicate that developed country outflows are still contracting two years 
into the current downturn (UNCTAD, 2010a). So, while outflows had 
almost returned to pre-crisis levels three years after the onset of the 
individual country crises, recovery could take longer this time. 
Moving on to emerging markets, figure 6 again plots median 
country real GDP growth and FDI trajectories around seven emerging 
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market crises for which we have data: Argentina (2001), Malaysia (1997), 
Mexico (1994), the Philippines (1997), Republic of Korea (1997), Russia 
(1998) and Thailand (1997). By contrast with the comparison between 
the current crisis and the earlier developed country crises, the data 
presented in figure 6 indicate that outgoing FDI from emerging markets 
has been more resilient during the current downturn compared to 
emerging market crises in the 1990s and early 2000s. Partly due to the 
increasing internationalizing of “Southern” TNCs and the decoupling 
of key emerging markets in the early stages of the current crisis, the 
relative drop after individual country crises was much larger than 
the approximately 20 per cent decline in outgoing investments from 
emerging economies observed since 2007. 
Figure 6. Median GDP growth and FDI trajectories
after 7 emerging market crisis
Despite their growing role as sources of FDI, emerging markets 
are still mostly capital importers. So, for our purposes, inflow patterns 
are the main interest in the aftermath of the emerging market crises. 
Several emerging economies experienced falling inward FDI levels during 
and after their economic crisis. After the 2001 crisis struck Argentina, 
for instance, inward FDI collapsed to levels similar to those of the early 
1990s. Nevertheless, as in the case of developed country crises, inflows 
to emerging markets were stable overall, or indeed rising, during and 
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after their crises.3 Stability was often backed up by FDI liberalizing 
policies. Following its crisis in the mid-1990s, for instance, Mexico 
liberalized important sectors of its economy over and above its 
NAFTA commitments (see e.g. Haber, 2005). The East Asian crisis 
likewise sparked liberal FDI reforms in a number of countries, 
resulting in considerable policy convergence across the region 
with respect to FDI regulation (Athukorala, 2003; UNCTAD, 2000, 
pp. 148 and 150). So rather than fostering FDI protectionism, 
past crises generally led to increased liberalization – as appears 
to be the case today. Yet, the resilience of FDI inflows to emerging 
economies after their earlier crises is in marked contrast to the 
grim FDI developments in 2009, where M&A deals and greenfield 
investments declined in most emerging markets – despite the 
equally open investment policy environment. And although 
slowly beginning to rise again in 2010, inflows to emerging 
markets remained more than 20 per cent below their 2008 level.
One indicator of the greater effect on inflows to emerging markets 
of the present crisis compared to past crises is that earnings and intra-
company debt exhibited much more pro-cyclical patterns than equity 
investments during past crises in emerging markets (World Bank, 2009, 
pp. 51–54). In order to limit the impact of economic turmoil in host 
countries without having to sell off assets, TNCs often reduced intra-
company loans to a much greater extent than equity holdings (figure 
7). For example, United States TNCs in countries affected by the Asian 
crisis repatriated all their income from the region to parent companies 
(World Bank, 2009, p. 52). Similarly, while there was a net inflow of 
United States FDI to Mexico in 1995, the current assets of United States 
affiliates there dipped while equity components remained stable, 
suggesting the withdrawal of liquid funds (Graham and Wada, 2000, 
pp. 794–796). Thus, while TNCs – like portfolio investors – typically 
pulled out funds from emerging markets during past crises, they did 
not relinquish their long-term strategic commitment. This is somewhat 
in contrast to the current downturn, where equity investments have 
declined substantially in both absolute and relative terms.  
3  This has been observed before. See Lipsey (2001), Sarno and Taylor (1999), 
Ramstetter (2000), Athukorala (2003) and UNCTAD (1998).  
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Figure 7. Intra-company loans versus equity components
of FDI during financial crises
(Percentage)
Global crises
Having examined the response of FDI to individual country 
crises, it may be informative to review crises which were not specific 
to individual countries, but more global in character. We follow Freund 
(2009) in identifying 1975, 1982, 1991, and 2001 as prolonged global 
downturns. In these episodes, world real GDP growth (i) fell below 2 
per cent; (ii) dropped more than 1.5 percentage points from previous 
five-year averages; and (iii) was at a minimum level compared to two 
years before and after. figure 8 plots global real FDI inflows against GDP 
growth around the four crises. 
Figure 8. FDI responses to four global downturns
(Inflows two years before downturns=100)
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During the oil shocks and the downturn in the early 1990s, it 
took an average of three years for FDI flows to recover after their first 
dip. These swift recoveries took place in the context of policies that 
were largely favourable towards FDI. During the 1970s and 1980s, both 
European and American FDI policies were generally liberal. Starting 
with the United States, the approach towards inward FDI of both the 
Carter and Reagan administrations was principally based on a doctrine 
of neutrality (Graham and Krugman, 1995). Though the Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) was created to keep 
track of investors coming to the United States, partly due to the rise of 
Japanese multinationals, it rejected very few M&A deals in practice and 
the fact of its existence certainly did not imply that the United States 
was closing its doors to inward FDI. Furthermore, both administrations 
also strongly supported US investment overseas, both rhetorically 
and by launching the United States Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) 
programme. Similar developments took place in Europe, where the 
Single European Act of the mid-1980s liberalized large parts of the 
European continent to foreign investment (OECD, 1992), and more and 
more European countries began treaty programmes to protect and 
promote their investors abroad. Furthermore, the debt crisis and global 
downturn in the 1980s similarly led the majority of Latin American 
countries to remove legislative and administrative barriers to FDI, 
which previously had closed large swathes of the continent to foreign 
firms (Williamson, 1990). Likewise, in the early 1990s, most countries 
further liberalized their FDI regimes, despite the downturn (UNCTAD, 
2010b). 
The policy responses regarding FDI were therefore largely 
comparable to today’s. But just as the three previous global downturns 
were minuscule compared to the current crisis, so were the initial FDI 
drops when compared to the collapse since 2007. A more interesting 
comparison may therefore be the FDI recession of the early 2000s. 
Here, the halt in developed country M&A deals led real inward FDI to 
fall by more than 40 per cent in 2001. The decline continued, with 25 
per cent in 2002 and a further 12 per cent the year after, which means 
the FDI collapse then was greater in percentage terms than the one the 
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world is facing now. In 2006, global FDI was still below its 2000 level,4 
which raises the question whether we should expect the current FDI 
recession to be as prolonged – or even longer – as the recession after 
2001? 
A return to the early 2000s?
Despite the greater FDI collapse in the early 2000s, the answer 
could very well be in the affirmative. This is for several reasons. First of 
all, equity investments have been affected to a greater extent during the 
current crisis than in the early 2000s (UNCTAD, 2009b). As mentioned 
above, equity investments are typically made for the long term, and 
their proportionate decline this time around may suggest that if 
anything, recovery will be longer than after the 2001 FDI recession.
Second, trade flows have dropped much more during the current 
downturn than in earlier global crises (Baldwin, 2010). Just as the 
current crisis is the largest since the Second World War, so has been the 
trade collapse; world trade may take a while to return to trend levels 
for the most badly affected regions – notably the United States and the 
European Union (IMF, 2010). 
Third, maintaining liberal FDI policy alone cannot be relied upon 
to contribute to a faster recovery than the previous crises. At the time 
of the last FDI slump in 2001, while security concerns prompted several 
countries to tighten their FDI regulations in the years after 9/11, this 
did not reverse the overall trend of prior decades, where investment 
liberalization and promotion “replaced red tape with red carpet 
treatment of foreign investors” (Sauvant 2009, p. 222). Thus, today’s 
liberal policy environment is no more favourable than those during the 
past crises. 
4   It should be noted that global FDI would have been higher in 2005 had it not 
been for the Homeland Investment Act, which created a one-year tax incentive for 
repatriation and led to a massive withdrawal of retained earnings from US foreign 
affiliates that year. From around $80 billion in 2004, repatriations rose to almost $300 
billion in 2005, and then dropped again to approximately $100 billion in 2006. As a 
result, reinvested earnings of American affiliates abroad dropped from around $160 
billion in 2004 to a negative $10 billion in 2005, and then bounced back to almost $220 
billion in 2006 (Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 7a).  
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Fourth, although countries like China and India that are rapidly 
growing in importance as both hosts and sources of investment could 
thus soften the current FDI recession, one should not exaggerate the 
contribution of emerging market outflows to global FDI. For now, they 
constitute only around one-quarter of world FDI flows. So although 
favourable investment prospects in key emerging markets, combined 
with increased South-South flows, does imply that emerging market 
FDI could rebound faster than that of developed countries5 – as they 
did in the early 2000s – Southern TNCs can not be relied upon to pull 
global FDI out of its current slump. 
Fifth, while world stock markets also plummeted in the early 
2000s, global real GDP growth never went below a positive level of 
2 per cent. This contrasts with the current downturn, in which the 
global economy contracted during 2009. This in particularly makes it 
unlikely that global FDI flows will recover more quickly after the current 
downturn, than they did after the 2001 plunge. In brief, there are no 
persuasive reasons to expect FDI to regain pre-crisis levels (around $2 
trillion) before at least 2014.
4. Conclusions
When attempting to forecast when, and how, the world will 
recover from the FDI recession, it is worth keeping in mind that just as 
predictions of financial resilience before the crisis turned out to be false, 
so any predictions of recovery could similarly be wide of the mark. This 
includes our own. But even if the worst of the current downturn has 
faded in the rear-view mirror, and world FDI bounces back quicker than 
we expect, do our observations have any implications for investment 
policymakers?
We think so. First of all, it is important to keep in mind that the 
scope and duration of the FDI recession depends primarily on how 
governments address the underlying macroeconomic risks of the 
5  This expectation accords with the results of a June 2010 survey conducted by 
the Economist Intelligence Unit on behalf of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA). According to those soundings, around 40 per cent of the almost 200 
surveyed executives expected to increase their investments to developing countries 
over the next year (MIGA, 2010).
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global economy in the coming years – including continued threats to 
financial stability. Here, FDI policies play only a minor role. And even if 
restraints on protectionist urges go some way to facilitate investments 
from abroad – in some cases enhancing the benefits of existing FDI 
(Moran, 2005) – in most countries, such restraint will do little to reverse 
the damage resulting from the crisis. Investment policymakers should 
therefore beware of myopia: in the vast majority of countries, the path 
of recovery from the crisis will not be paved by ever-greater incentives 
for TNCs, more favourable investment contracts, or a rush to enter into 
investment treaties. 
Rather than desperately scrambling to increase the volume of 
FDI flows, officials might instead use the downturn as an opportunity 
to take a step back and reconsider their thinking. In recent decades – 
including during times of crisis – host country FDI policies have largely 
focused on increasing the volume of inward investment. In some cases, 
this is indeed still necessary. But not all FDI promotes development; 
larger quantities of FDI flows cannot be the sole indicator of a successful 
development policy. To increase the positive impact of FDI for economic 
development, and avoid the adverse consequences, officials should 
instead consider a “sustainable FDI” strategy, which enhances not only 
the quantity of investments, but also the “quality” (Vale Center and 
WAIPA, 2010). 
Acknowledging that administrative and political constraints 
will prevent wholesale reforms of FDI regimes – particularly as the 
crisis demands a focus on other more pressing policy areas for most 
governments – a prudent and more realistic approach would be to 
target the most binding constraints on sustainable FDI promotion (see 
Hausman et al., 2007). These are bound to be country- and sector-
specific. If fairer contract and treaty negotiations can provide the 
greatest benefits for a country, scarce resources would be best spent 
investing in more in-house legal expertise. If it is greater links between 
foreign investors and domestic firms, then providing technical and 
other support to potential domestic suppliers could prove instrumental 
(see UNCTAD, 2001). In some cases, environmental damage will be the 
greatest obstacle to sustainable FDI promotion, while in others, the 
problem of foreign investors taking advantage of non-transparent and 
corrupt state institutions is what must be addressed. And so forth.
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Suffice it to say, this is easier said than done, and will require 
considerable expertise and institutional capacity at national and sub-
national levels, features which are often absent in emerging markets 
in particular. And unless carefully implemented, reforms could conflict 
with investment treaty obligations, and thereby expose governments 
to expensive investor-state arbitrations. Multilateral organizations, 
aid-donors and non-governmental agencies will therefore clearly have 
important roles to play. Academics can contribute, too. Rather than 
providing long shopping-lists of institutional and governance reforms, 
they could instead focus on operational methodologies to identify 
where investment policymakers realistically can get the most out of 
their scarce resources towards more sustainable FDI strategies. Finally, 
TNCs can often benefit as well from promoting more sustainable and 
transparent FDI regimes.
Ultimately, however, policy reforms have to start at home. 
Governments therefore ought to consider whether the crisis should 
simply prompt more liberalization in an attempt to attract TNCs – as 
was the pattern during earlier crises – or rather mark the beginning 
of sustainable FDI regimes at the national and international levels. In 
most cases, the balance between the two will do little to prolong or 
shorten the FDI recession over the next few years, but it will surely have 
important economic and social welfare implications over the longer 
term. 
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